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American equal protection jurisprudence reflects various competing
conceptions of equality. This Article will compare Justice Ginsburg's
treatment of gender and racial classifications. When considering
constitutional challenges to gender classifications, Justice Ginsburg has
focused closely on individual merit and eliminating barriers that deny women
equal opportunities and respect as citizens. Even in the context of preferences
or affirmative action for women, Justice Ginsburg has applied searching
scrutiny to overturn gender classifications based on stereotypes about men
and women. Justice Ginsburg has focused on a view of equality that turns on
individual merit, individual achievement, and eliminating barriers that treat
women as women, rather than as individuals. By contrast, in the context of
racial classifications, Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly voted to uphold
affirmative action programs that treat individuals differently on the basis of
race. Here she has emphasized group harms and subordination, a very
different principle of equality that considers the relative position of racial
groups in society, rather than the needs of particular individuals. Her
decisions demonstrate less skepticism and greater tolerance for government
policies that give preferences to racial minorities. Although gender and race
are different types of personal characteristics, it is not immediately obvious
why different equality principles should apply to racial minorities on the one
hand and to women on the other.
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Most commentators have suggested that Justice Ginsburg's race and
gender jurisprudence are cut from the same cloth.' I think, however, that her
decisions pose a puzzle: why would the Equal Protection Clause require an
individualistic conception of equality for women, but a group-based view of
equality for racial minorities?
This Article examines two competing principles of equality and then
turns to Justice Ginsburg's decisions about gender and racial equality to
demonstrate the different principles of equality that she employs. There is
little to explain why individual treatment and freedom from stereotypes
should be the principle for women, but not for racial minorities. Justice
Ginsburg provides many good reasons for why gender equality requires the
government to refrain from enacting policies based on gender stereotypes
about the roles, abilities, and interests of women and men. She emphasizes
that formal equality or preventing discrimination against individuals best
serves the interests of women, despite their historically disadvantaged
position in society. These arguments should naturally, and perhaps even
more urgently, apply to racial equality.
I. Two CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying "to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'2 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to contain an
equal protection component. 3 As a legal and philosophical concept, however,
equality has many different meanings. In interpreting constitutional equality
guarantees, the Supreme Court must determine what equality requires in
particular circumstances. The understanding of equality has been contested
and has proceeded along two roughly different tracks, identified by Owen
Fiss as principles of "antidiscrimination" and "antisubordination. ' '4 These
two principles reflect the debate between different approaches to the theory,
scope, and implementation of the Equal Protection Clause. These
distinctions, often discussed in the context of racial equality, mirror debates
1 See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1789, 1850-53 (2008) (explaining how Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence
represents a convergence or possibility of synthesis between doctrines of sex and race
equality); Deborah Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Jurisprudence of Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 39, 45-46 (2004)
(explaining how Justice Ginsburg's approach to racial equality extends from her
commitment to gender equality).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
40wen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
108 (Winter 1976) [hereinafter Fiss, Groups].
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in feminist theory between liberal feminists and radical feminists.5
Understanding these distinctions will help situate Justice Ginsburg's
jurisprudence of equality with regard to both race and gender.
The principle of antidiscrimination relates to formal equality, to neutral
principles that treat individuals the same, regardless of their race or gender.6
This principle focuses on fairness and considers whether government policy
treats individuals equally, particularly in the allocation of scarce goods. The
antidiscrimination principle focuses on individuals rather than groups. This
has been the predominant, though not exclusive, understanding of equality in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 7 Liberal feminists also follow an
antidiscrimination principle and focus on individual rights and autonomy, not
special rights or privileges for women. 8 Justice Ginsburg's advocacy and
jurisprudence is regularly associated with such liberal feminism because she
successfully advocated formal gender equality, not special treatment for
women.
9
Fiss and others found this individualistic and formal conception of
equality too narrow, and thus articulated another principle of equality-the
antisubordination or "group-disadvantaging" principle of equality. 10 As most
5 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1288 (1991) (contrasting an "essentially assimilationist approach" to formal
equality for women with approaches that focus on women's differences and pervasive
male domination); Cynthia V. Ward, The Radical Feminist Defense of Individualism, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (1995) (discussing the liberal-radical divide in feminist
theory); see also Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 413, 413 (1994)
(examining feminist legal theory and explaining that it evolved from egalitarianism to
more radical theories focused on subordination).
6 Fiss, Groups, supra note 4, at 108 (explaining that the antidiscrimination principle
"reduce[s] the ideal of equality to the principle of equal treatment-similar things should
be treated similarly.").
7 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 & n.10 (2004)
("Scholars debate what our constitutional understanding of equality ought to be, but most
would agree that American equal protection law has expressed anticlassification, rather
than antisubordination, commitments as it has developed over the past half-century.").
8 See, e.g., Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation,
1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 99; see also MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1286 (explaining how
the women's movement initially focused on strict equality and "called for an end to legal
classifications on the basis of sex").
9 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803, 829-30 (1990) (explaining that liberal feminism is "viewed as the dominant theory"
behind constitutional litigation brought by Ginsburg and others during the 1970s).
10 See Fiss, Groups, supra note 4, at 108; Owen Fiss, Another Equality, ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1-4 (2004), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art20 [hereinafter Fiss,
Another Equality].
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forms of legal and state-sponsored racial discrimination receded from our
society, the idea was to set forth a principle of equality that could respond to
the historical and structural discrimination that remained, particularly for
blacks.1 1 The antisubordination principle focuses on group harms, on
disadvantages suffered by particular groups in society. The basic idea is that
certain social practices, including but not limited to discrimination, should
be condemned not because of any unfairness in the transaction attributable
to the poor fit between means and ends, but rather because such practices
create or perpetuate the subordination of the group of which the individual
excluded or rejected is a member.12
This principle forbids policies that disadvantage groups or that
perpetuate or create subordination of the group. This is not just a theoretical
construct, but a principle that courts should use "to govern interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause."'13
As a matter of implementation, Fiss explains that the antisubordination
principle encourages affirmative action because it promotes individuals from
disadvantaged groups to positions of power and prestige and therefore alters
the relative position of the group.14 Moreover, such policies will improve the
self-image of members of disadvantaged groups and will also change the
attitudes of others, resulting in "racial dehierarchization."1 5
Antisubordination theory focuses on outcomes, raising the status of
disadvantaged groups such as racial minorities by seeking a more equal
distribution of goods and benefits. It recognizes that racial preferences may
produce unfairness to some individuals but this "can be justified as a
sacrifice incurred in order to achieve a transcendent goal-accelerating the
process by which caste and its cognates are eliminated."'16
Antisubordination theory has parallels with non-liberal (radical) feminist
theory, which focuses not on individual equality, but rather on the systemic
11 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination, ISSUEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 5-6 (2003),
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl 1 (noting the high stakes over whether the Supreme
Court chose an antidiscrimination or antisubordination principle in assessing programs
such as affirmative action); Owen Fiss, Another Equality, supra note 10, at 5-6
(explaining the historical circumstances leading to articulation of the antisubordination
principle).
12 Fiss, Another Equality, supra note 10, at 3-4.
13 1d. at5.
14 Id at 6-7.




and structural causes of gender inequality. 17 "Radical feminists believe that
liberal ideas of individual rights and autonomy-based justice are not merely
the wrong way to end sex inequality but help to perpetuate it, since they
reflect inherently male ways of being."'18 These feminists focus on achieving
substantive equality for women, not from a purportedly neutral point of view
or from the existing "male" perspective, but rather from the perspective of
women. As Catharine MacKinnon explains: "Equality understood
substantively rather than abstractly, defined on women's own terms and in
terms of women's concrete experience, is what women in society most need
and most do not have .... Sex inequality is thus a social and political
institution." 19 As with antisubordination theorists, radical feminists focus on
the legal, social, and structural institutions that perpetuate inequality for
women-they reject (or at least find inadequate) formal equality as a remedy
to discrimination against women because of the existing subordinated status
of women in society and the need for concrete, not abstract, equality for
women.20
While these two principles, antidiscrimination and antisubordination,
reflect very different theoretical understandings of equality, they rarely
present themselves in a pure form in Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme
Court is not engaged in theorizing about equality, but rather must decide
claims about equal protection and provide public justifications for their
decisions. Legal arguments about racial and gender quality tend to
intermingle these principles. For instance, a decision may emphasize formal
equality and invalidate an affirmative action program, but seek to justify the
result as beneficial for minority groups. Alternatively, a decision that
emphasizes group harms may allow affirmative action and explain that such
unequal treatment is required to achieve formal equality for individuals in the
future. Nonetheless, many decisions can be seen as primarily adopting one of
the two approaches, with important consequences for the eventual decision.
Practically speaking, in cases dealing with exclusionary discrimination
against racial minorities and women, the antidiscrimination and
17See Fiss, "hat is Feminism?, supra note 5, at 423 (arguing that most feminist
thought is not liberal because it advocates state activism and that "[t]he intervention they
call for is structural in nature, trying to alter basic social institutions like the family and
the market, and is not predicated upon finding that the individual against whom state
power is brought to bear has committed a discrete wrong").
18 Ward, supra note 5, at 873.
19 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 244
(1989).
20 See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1324 ("Inequality ... is first concrete, historical,
present, and material, only derivatively generic, and never abstract .... The equality
principle, in this approach, is properly comprised of the practical necessities for ending
inequality in each of its real forms.").
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antisubordination principles point in the same direction-they prohibit such
discrimination because it violates formal equality on the one hand, and
burdens already disadvantaged groups on the other. It is in the context of
relatively new debates over equality, such as programs of preferential
treatment, that the two principles often conflict. The different theoretical
underpinnings of the two approaches to equality come into focus particularly
when assessing affirmative measures to help racial minorities or women. In
the context of these so-called benign programs, antidiscrimination or liberal
approaches focus on individual harms and fairness to all individuals-formal
equality requires treating each person the same. Therefore it views "benign"
preferences in much the same way as "invidious" discrimination. It does not
matter who is receiving preferences, because it undermines equality to treat
individuals as members of groups based on characteristics such as race and
gender, rather than as individuals. In practice, formal equality is
straightforward. It requires treating people the same and so does not allow
distinctions to be drawn along lines of race or gender, except in the most
limited circumstances.
By contrast, antisubordination focuses on group harms to ensure that
certain groups do not remain a subclass in our society. This principle
advances something distinct from formal equality and emphasizes reordering
social relationships to eliminate systemic disadvantage or subordination of
particular groups. Accordingly, in this view, affirmative action and other
race-conscious policies may be necessary to remedy racial hierarchies.
Treating individuals unequally may be tolerated and even encouraged to
bring about greater substantive equality and also to produce the right
attitudes about equality, both in the disadvantaged group and in the minds of
others. Group-based equality is necessarily more complicated than formal
equality because it depends on a view of the existing hierarchy and what
policies would undermine rather than reinforce the hierarchy. The assessment
of group disadvantage depends in part on beliefs and intuitions about social
norms relating to who constitutes a subordinated group, and what policies
and practices contribute to that subordination. Evaluating subordination
requires a judge to determine which individuals are part of a disadvantaged
group. This may prove to be a very difficult task for the judiciary.21
Moreover, even if a group can be identified, the court must evaluate what
policies disadvantage the group. For example, people strongly differ about
whether affirmative action reinforces or helps to eradicate racial
21 See Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the Irrelevance of 'Groups,
IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 6-8 (2004), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl
(discussing the practical problems encountered in trying to implement the
antisubordination principle, such as difficulties in defining social groups, their relative
status, and which laws worsen the status of such groups).
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subordination. Similarly, feminists of different perspectives differ about
whether bans against pornography and prostitution help to eradicate female
subordination or instead constitute paternalistic regulation of women's
autonomy. Identifying subordination will often be a contentious matter
because of different social and political beliefs and commitments-these are
disagreements about the social order that exists and/or the social order that
should exist. Courts are ill-suited to sort through these difficult questions. 22
These different equality principles also reflect fundamentally different
views of human dignity. Liberal antidiscrimination perspectives choose an
individualistic account of human dignity--dignity inheres in each person
equally and therefore we respect such dignity by treating each person as an
individual, rather than as a member of a group based on characteristics such
as race or gender.23 Antisubordination, by contrast, espouses a dignity of
recognition.24 It focuses on the relationship between the individual and
society, and considers that an individual's self-worth depends on the extent
to which the society treats him or her in a certain way. It is concerned with
attitudes of subordination and with the resulting facts of inequality. To
remedy these attitudes may require affirmative measures directed at
particular groups. This is not the dignity of the individual, but rather a
socially defined dignity of belonging.
Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence with regard to gender equality
consistently and forcefully espouses an antidiscrimination principle. When
faced with unequal treatment for women and men, Justice Ginsburg's
decisions have focused on formal equality, on considering the fairness of
treating men and women differently in particular contexts. 25 In most
instances, she finds that such distinctions lack an appropriate means-end fit-
that policy distinctions drawn on the lines of gender rarely serve any
legitimate state purpose. Justice Ginsburg views even well-intentioned
preferences for women with skeptical scrutiny. As the examples below will
demonstrate, when faced with equal protection challenges to laws that
distinguish on the basis of gender, Justice Ginsburg emphasizes individual
interests, not harms suffered by men or women as a group.
By contrast, in cases dealing with racial equality, Justice Ginsburg
speaks the language of antisubordination. In arguing to uphold a wide variety
of affirmative action programs, Justice Ginsburg has focused on group
22 See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action and the Group-Disadvantaging Principle,
IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 9-10 (2004), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl4
(providing institutional reasons why the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the
antisubordination principle).
23 See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity (forthcoming).
24 See id
2 5 See infra Part H.
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harms, the remnants of a racial caste system, and the need to elevate the
status of racial minorities.26 Her decisions emphasize the persistent facts of
racial disparities in income, health, and welfare, in order to demonstrate that
racial minorities continue to be subordinated in our society. Based on these
facts, she has argued that less searching scrutiny should apply to preferences
for racial minorities because such programs benefit disadvantaged groups
and therefore may be compatible with equal protection.
The principles of antidiscrimination and antisubordination express
fundamentally different conceptions of equality, which lead to different
results, particular in the context of affirmative action or preference programs.
These principles can help identify and understand the different conceptions
of equality Justice Ginsburg uses to evaluate claims of gender equality on the
one hand and racial equality on the other.
II. GENDER AND INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
In equal protection challenges to gender classifications, the Supreme
Court applies heightened scrutiny to determine whether the classification
serves important government objectives and whether the policy is
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.27 In particular,
Justice Ginsburg, as well as a majority of the Court, have focused on the
harm of classifying people by gender because such classifications reinforce
stereotypes about men and women.28 The following examples demonstrate
that Justice Ginsburg remains firmly committed to principles of
antidiscrimination in the context of gender classifications. Justice Ginsburg's
egalitarian and liberal viewpoint requires in most instances the same
treatment for men and women.29
26 See infra Part III.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
28 Id. at 550.
29 Some scholars have suggested that these decisions can be seen as part of the
antisubordination tradition to the extent that they express concern for women as a class of
individuals. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis after United States
v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U.
CI. LEGAL. F. 381, 384 (identifying an antisubordination principle in the VMI decision
and explaining that the language of the opinion "suggests that the goal of intermediate
scrutiny is to identify and strike down rules that maintain the traditional hierarchy of men
over women, rather than to determine which differences between the sexes can justify
their disparate treatment"). The antisubordination principle, however, is not the primary
concern of these decisions, which instead emphasize the individual and the harm that
results from classifying an individual along gender lines. Most commentators, both
critical and not, identify Justice Ginsburg's advocacy and jurisprudence with liberal
individualism and egalitarianism. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement
[Vol. 70:41060
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A. Supreme Court Decisions on Gender Equality
Justice Ginsburg's decisions considering equal protection challenges to
gender classifications emphasize the equality of men and women and the
imperative of removing legal classifications that stereotype women and men
and thereby frustrate their equal participation in society. In these decisions,
Justice Ginsburg focuses on the individual and emphasizes equality of
opportunity, not equality of results. For example, in United States v. Virginia
she wrote the opinion for the Court invalidating the Virginia Military
Institute's (VMI) male-only admissions policy.3 0 Justice Ginsburg explained
that to defend the male-only program at VMI, Virginia would have to
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification."'31 Moreover, such
justification "must be genuine... [a]nd it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females." 32 State action does not comport with equal protection "when a
law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature--equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities. ''33
While recognizing that single-sex education can have pedagogical benefits,
she explained, "'benign' justifications proffered in defense of categorical
exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must
describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact
differently grounded."'34
Examining the history of higher education in Virginia, Justice Ginsburg
concluded that there was no evidence that the male-only admissions policy at
VMI furthered a state policy of diversity, but instead rested in part on the
historic exclusion of women from higher education. 35 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg instructed that the Court must take a "'hard look' at generalizations
or 'tendencies' of the kind advanced by Virginia because qualified
individuals cannot be excluded based on "fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females. '36 The rationale that admitting women
would reduce VMI's stature and unique form of education, Justice Ginsburg
(Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 280-81 (2008) (citing Justice
Ginsburg's approach as a prime example of liberal feminism).
30 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996).
31Id. at 531.
32 Id. at 533.
33 Id. at 532.
34 Id. at 535-36.
35 Id. at 539-40.
36 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725 (1982)).
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found to be "a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from
other 'self-fulfilling prophecies.' 37 Justice Ginsburg's probing inquiry of
Virginia's justifications reflected a "skeptical scrutiny of official action
denying rights or opportunities based on sex." 38
Although Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that many women (and even
men) would not be attracted to VMI's particular form of education, still
women could not be categorically excluded.39  She stressed that
generalizations about what most women would choose cannot be used to
deny opportunities for women "whose talent and capacity place them outside
the average description." 40 She relied on findings that some women would be
capable of the activities required by VMI cadets and that some women could
meet the stringent physical standards. Therefore, "[i]t is on behalf of these
women that the United States has instituted this suit, and it for them that a
remedy must be crafted, a remedy that will end their exclusion from a state-
supplied educational opportunity for which they are fit."41 The extent of
Justice Ginsburg's commitment to liberal, individualist principles can be
further appreciated by what she did not require or consider. She did not focus
on whether a significant number of women would be admitted under a new
policy, nor did she require a different admissions standard for women to
promote substantive equality.42 Rather, the Court simply required that VMI
allow women to try to meet the existing standards of the school and
emphasized the importance of allowing women with appropriate
credentials-the will, capacity, and fitness-the opportunity to apply and be
admitted to the elite program.43 "Women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality
37 1d. at 542-43.
38Id. at 531.
39 Id. at 542 ("It may be assumed, for purposes of this decision, that most women
would not choose VMI's adversative method .... [l]t is also probable that 'many men
would not want to be educated in such an environment."').
40 1d, at 550.
41 Id.
42 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540-41 (discussing how some women could use VMI's
existing standards and benefit from its current adversative approach to education). Justice
Ginsburg's liberal approach to gender equality has been criticized in other contexts. For
example, David Cole has criticized Ginsburg's advocacy and litigating strategy before
she was on the Supreme Court because she rejected difference theory and embraced an
"assimilationist method." David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's
Rights in a Man's World, 2 L. & INEQ. 33, 55 (1984); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminism
and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 830-31 (1990) (discussing the radical
feminist critique of Ginsburg's liberal feminist advocacy).
43 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 ("The issue, however, is not whether 'women-or
men-should be forced to attend VI'; rather, the question is whether the
Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the
training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.").
[Vol. 70:41062
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
education cannot be offered anything less, under the Commonwealth's
obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection." 44
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that equal protection required treating
women as individuals and allowing them to follow their talents and merits
wherever they may lead.45 Such a remedy was important even if it affected
only a small number of women "outside the average description"46 with the
will and capacity to attend VMI. She emphasized that such equality of
opportunity was necessary to maintaining equal citizenship in our society.47
Accordingly, "State actors controlling gates to opportunity... may not
exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females."' 48 Such citizenship depends, in part, on
individuals being judged according to their merit, not based on stereotypes
about their capabilities or social roles. The VMI decision centers on equality
of opportunity for individual women. Although Justice Ginsburg did not use
the word, the decision celebrates the individual dignity of women-the
dignity of autonomy to make choices about education and one's future and to
open up the fullest range of choices to both men and women.
Similarly, in Miller v. Albright,49 the Court considered a challenge to an
immigration law that treated children born out of wedlock differently based
on whether their mother or father was an American citizen. Under the law, a
child born abroad to an unmarried citizen mother and alien father became an
American citizen at birth, whereas an unmarried citizen father had to take
additional steps before his child born abroad to an alien mother could
become an American citizen.50 The government explained that the special
rule for unmarried citizen mothers was based, in part, on "an assumption that
the citizen mother would probably have custody."'51 The Court, in a 6-3
decision written by Justice Stevens, upheld the statute explaining that it did
not rest on impermissible gender stereotypes, but rather that the "biological
44 Id. at 557.
4 5 Id. at 532.
461d. at 550.
47 Id. at 545-46 (explaining that women "today count as citizens in our American
democracy equal in stature to men. Just as surely, the Commonwealth's great goal is not
substantially advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their
individual merit, from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps."); see also
id. at 532.
48 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at
725).
49 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
50 Id. at 429-31 (describing the statutory requirements).
51 Id. at 430 n.8. The government also cited the rule in most foreign countries that
the nationality of an illegitimate child is that of the mother unless paternity has been
established. Id.
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differences between single men and single women provide a relevant basis
for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children
born in foreign lands."'52 The gender classification at issue sought to assist
women and, as Justice Stevens explained, appropriately recognized the
different situations of unmarried mothers and fathers in part because of the
essential biological role of women in childbirth.5 3 He found that such
"assumptions are firmly grounded and adequately explain why Congress
found it unnecessary to impose [citizenship] requirements on the mother that
were entirely appropriate for the father." 54
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg explained that the law could have made
custody or support the relevant criterion, but instead "treats mothers one way,
fathers another, shaping Government policy to fit and reinforce the
stereotype or historic pattern." 55 She also emphasized that even if the
stereotypes hold true for many, even most, individuals, still the government
should not classify unnecessarily or overbroadly by gender.56 Government
policy cannot rest on "the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers to care for their children, or to develop caring relationships
with their children." 57 Justice Ginsburg agreed that the statute at issue in
Miller was a sort of benign preference, "an affirmative action of sorts."58
Nonetheless, she explained the policy violated equal protection by using "sex
as a criterion in delineating citizens' rights."59 Accordingly, she argued that
even if one accepts the government's stated beneficial purposes, "it is surely
based on generalizations (stereotypes) about the way women (or men) are.
These generalizations pervade the opinion of Justice Stevens, which
constantly relates and relies on what 'typically,' or 'normally,' or 'probably,'
happens 'often."' 60  Justice Ginsburg emphasized that gender-based
52 1d. at 445.
53 Id. at 444 (explaining that the statute does not assume that mothers of illegitimate
children will have a closer relationship to their children than father, but "[i]t does assume
that all of them will be present at the event that transmits their citizenship to the child").
54 Miller, 523 U.S. at 444.
55 Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56 Id. ("Characteristic of sex-based classifications, the stereotypes underlying this
legislation may hold true for many, even most, individuals. But in prior decisions the
Court has rejected official actions that classify unnecessarily and overbroadly by gender
when more accurate and impartial functional lines can be drawn.").
57 Id. at 482-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 461.
60 Id. at 469.
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classifications could not be used when more neutral categories would serve
the legislature's purpose.61
At root in Miller was the assumption that mothers have primary
responsibility for children, reinforcing and perpetuating stereotypes about
gender and parenting. Justice Ginsburg's dissent reflected concerns of
individual fairness, for the lack of a persuasive fit between the government's
means and ends in enacting citizenship policy. She opposed the "preference"
for women because she considered that such unequal treatment of mothers
and fathers legally reinforced gender stereotypes. No doubt many (or even
most) unmarried mothers have primary responsibility for their children.
Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg argued for equal treatment for the individual,
who may be atypical or unusual, not for the individual as part of a socially
defined group. Justice Ginsburg implicitly evaluated the harm of gender
classifications to be greater than any benefit to be derived by giving women a
preference when they have children out of wedlock-a choice for formal
equality over substantive benefits. The Miller dissent embraces liberal
principles of equality by espousing a principle for all individuals.
B. Advocacy and Scholarship on Gender Equality
Justice Ginsburg's work as an advocate for women's equality and also
her scholarly work as a law professor emphasized ideals of equality of
opportunity, of removing stereotypes that discriminated against women. At
times, however, Ginsburg suggests that affirmative action or gender
classifications may be necessary to correct for past discrimination or
exclusion from opportunities. For example, she cites to Califano v. Webster62
as an example of an appropriate preference. 63 In Webster, the Court upheld a
Social Security Act provision that allowed women to eliminate low-earning
years from the calculation of their retirement benefits. 64 The Court explained
that the classification was specifically designed to correct wage imbalance
between men and women and was not based on "overbroad
generalizations." 65 Ginsburg commented that Webster "looks toward a
general rule of equal treatment while leaving a slim corridor open for
61 Miller, 523 U.S. at 469-70.
62430 U.S. 313 (1977).
63 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451,
471 (1978); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:
An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 271 (1999).
64 Webster, 430 U.S. at 314-16.
65 Id. at 317.
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genuinely compensatory classification." 66 This seems a neat summary of the
Ginsburg position with regard to benign gender classifications over the
years-an emphasis on equal treatment with a slim possibility of preferences
to compensate for past discrimination.
Justice Ginsburg, however, has repeatedly explained just how narrow the
possibility remains for gender preferences, a position that reflects the
"skeptical scrutiny" 67 she applies to distinctions based on gender. For
example, in Kahn v. Shevin, a case challenging a small tax benefit given to
widows but not widowers, then-Professor Ginsburg argued that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed68and Frontiero v. Richardson69 had a clear
message:
[P]ersons similarly situated, whether male or female, must be accorded
even-handed treatment by the law; lump treatment of men, on the one hand,
and women on the other is constitutionally impermissible. Legislative
classifications may legitimately take account of need or ability; they may
not be premised on sex-role stereotypes or unalterable sex characteristics
that bear no necessary relationship to an individual's need, ability or life
situation.70
"[E]ven-handed treatment" by the law states an antidiscrimination
principle based on formal equality for men and women. It does not usually
require or tolerate special treatment for women because of longstanding
economic and legal discrimination and it does not seek to reinforce the group
identity of women by providing benefits tailored only to women.
Importantly, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the law must consider
individual need and ability and thereby undermined the view that women as a
group may systematically have need for special benefits.
In articles from the 1970s, Ginsburg argued that "the ultimate goal with
respect to sex-based discrimination should be a system of genuine
neutrality."'71 She supported affirmative action for women, but on very
limited grounds, and with great skepticism about benign rationales offered
66 Ginsburg, supra note 63; see also Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 63 (explaining
that in Webster the Court "endorsed a societal discrimination rationale" similar to the one
it rejected in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
67 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
68 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69411 U.S. 677 (1973).
70 Brief for Appellants at 11, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78). See
generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).




for "assisting" women. Although Ginsburg did not seek to avoid all gender-
based affirmative action, her approach to it was restrained, as "designed not
to confer favors but to assure that women with capacity to do the job are set
on a par with men of similar capacity. ' 72 This conception is not one of
preference or favoritism for women, but rather removing discriminatory
obstacles so that women can compete with men.73 Ginsburg's description of
appropriate affirmative action focused on individual ability and talent, not on
preferences for women as part of a historically disadvantaged group.74 Any
deviations from the principle of neutrality must be closely related to a
compensatory purpose and be limited in duration so that equality of
opportunity remains the goal.
Moreover, in her writings as well as in some of her opinions, Justice
Ginsburg has suggested that preferential treatment can lead to the
subordination of women. As she explained, proponents of the Equal Rights
Amendment (as she was) "perceive laws for 'women only' as ultimately
harmful to the group they purport to protect, and favors as characteristically
entailing an accompanying detriment. '75 Thus, she argued that the lower
status of women would be reinforced by preferences designed just for
women. Put another way, affirmative action for women may perpetuate their
subordination by continuing to classify them along gender lines. The
"favors" entail an unavoidable detriment. This theme of classification and
subordination is also expressed, for instance, by Justice Thomas, who has
repeatedly argued that preferences for racial minorities reinforce perceptions
of inferiority both in the broader society and in the minds of the
beneficiaries. 76
7 2 1d. at 28.
73 In other contexts, Justice Ginsburg has similarly upheld women's equal
responsibilities alongside men and denied special favoritism based on a woman's role
within the family. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); see also Merritt & Lieberman, supra note 1, at 43-44 (explaining that in
Bennis, Ginsburg "viewed Tina Bennis as an economic actor fully equal to her husband
and other men").
74 In Ginsburg's view, affirmative action requires first stopping discriminatory
practices that favor males and whites over women and nonwhites. Second, it requires
measures to correct the consequences of previous discrimination, such as "special efforts
to seek out and recruit qualified members of groups once excluded ... [and the]
elimination of employment tests, standards and qualifications that are not reliable
predictors of requisite performance; in-service training programs." As a final resort, she
would allow "goals and timetables or outright quotas for a transition period." Ginsburg,
supra note 71, at 28-30.
75 Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 15 (emphasis added).
76 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School
because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This
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Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly argued that preferences for women come
with detriments. Such programs must be carefully evaluated to judge whether
they stem from any perceived stereotype of women or whether they are
genuinely designed to level the playing field. Ginsburg refuses to accept
benign rationales for gender preferences because they often stem from
exclusionary motives, and, even if well-intentioned, may reinforce
stereotypes that limit the participation of women in society. Individual
opportunity for women can be hampered by such classifications even if they
have beneficent purposes.
Preferences for women express two distinct harms that are often
conflated. The first is that the preference may in fact be a detriment-for
example, so-called preferences for women that kept them from jury service,
or tending bar, or taking the Bar. These are exclusions of women
masquerading as benefits and are properly treated as outright gender
discrimination and exclusion. Other preferences, however, may genuinely
intend to help women by providing some type of tangible benefit. Examples
of this may be seen in Miller v. Albright, providing a benefit for citizen
mothers over fathers,77 or in Kahn v. Shevin, affording a small tax benefit to
widows, but not widowers.78 Even the truly "benign" preferences, however,
may cause harm, as Ginsburg has argued, because they reinforce existing
social roles for women. The harm with such well-intentioned programs is one
of discrimination against men, but also in Ginsburg's view, a harm of
subordination of women because such classifications assume that women
must be primarily responsible for childrearing and homemaking and
therefore cannot compete with men on an equal footing outside the home.
Thus, for Justice Ginsburg, the group classification is itself the burden
because it reinforces the gender hierarchy between women and men.
Some feminists have criticized Justice Ginsburg's advocacy for its
assimilationist approach.79 These feminists question the validity of a gender-
problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are
actually the 'beneficiaries' of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the
highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether
their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the
stigma. . . ."); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(recognizing a "fundamental[] truth that the government cannot discriminate among its
citizens on the basis of race .... At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this reason that we must subject all
racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny ... ").
77 523 U.S. at 420; see supra note 58 & accompanying text.
78 416 U.S. at 351; see supra note 70 & accompanying text.
79 See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 214 ("[T]he problem with formal equality is not simply that it is incapable of
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neutral approach and find formal equality inadequate. 80 Such feminists thus
call for various changes to benefit women as a group and also to protect them
from harms of violence and exploitation. 81 They speak the language of
antisubordination and often approve of preferences for women. Justice
Ginsburg, however, has argued that such preferences perpetuate a gender
hierarchy in which women do not have equal opportunities. 82 She recognizes
that even if programs provide some "help" to women, or reflect realities
about existing social roles, nonetheless they violate equal protection by
treating women and men differently based on stereotypes and generalizations
that do not have any necessary connection to gender. In spite of any practical
benefits to women, preferences that reinforce outdated stereotypes about
women's roles should not be tolerated. Justice Ginsburg has not heeded the
calls of some feminists to treat women differently based on their gender or to
allow state and federal legislatures to pursue such policies when they conflict
with her liberal, individualistic view of equal protection.
Since Reed v. Reed,83 the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that
gender classifications cannot rest on impermissible stereotypes about women.
Even if the stereotype reflects, as stereotypes always do, some truth about the
roles of men and women, stereotypes about gender characteristics usually
remain an impermissible basis for government policy. The idea is for each
person to be treated as an individual, based on his or her particular qualities.
This position has been accepted by a substantial majority of the Supreme
radically changing society or of ensuring that similarly situated women and men are
treated similarly. Formal equality has actually hurt many women.., it is likely to hurt
most mothers and wives who are not well-paid professionals."); MacKinnon, supra note
5, at 1288-92 (criticizing the "essentially assimilationist approach" of early feminist
advocacy as minimizing real differences between men and women and failing to improve
conditions of inequality for most women); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara
Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 9, 17 (acknowledging criticism of 1970s litigation as "insistent on formal equality,
opening doors only to comfortably situated women willing to accept men's rules and be
treated like men," but rejecting such comments as unfair).
80 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 79, at 202 (explaining a consensus within the
feminist community that "formal equality is inadequate" and arguing that no single
abstract standard will solve women's problems).
81 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1296.
82 See Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in
Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginburg, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 251, 272 (2009)
(discussing Ginsburg's difficulty in persuading an all-male Supreme Court about the
"double-edged" nature of legal benefits for women that perpetuated harmful stereotypes,
the "most insidious of those stereotypes, Ginsburg believed, was that of male
breadwinner and female homemaker").
83 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Court. For example, in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,84
the Court upheld an award of money damages against States for violation of
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for six members of the Court, explained how stereotypes could fuel
discrimination against women:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men ....
These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary
family caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees. 85
In the context of gender classifications, Justice Ginsburg and a solid
majority of the Court have embraced a liberal and highly individualistic view
of equality. Government policies that rest on outmoded gender stereotypes
will usually not survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 86
Although this is only a brief survey, Justice Ginsburg's life work with regard
to gender equality reflects a deep commitment to the individual, to ensuring
that the law does not treat individuals according to typecasts, or averages, or
stereotypes, but rather allows them to use their talents and capacities as they
choose.
III. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
When government policies classify individuals by race, they treat
individuals differently based on the racial group to which they belong. In the
past such classifications were used to exclude racial minorities from many
political rights as well as social and economic benefits. In recent years,
however, most racial classifications aim to benefit racial minorities by
providing affirmative action or preferences for some scarce good, such as
84 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
85 Id. at 736; see also Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's
New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871, 1871
(2006).
86 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has been termed a "de facto
ERA." Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REv. 951, 985
(2002). Though failing to be ratified, scholars have argued that the ERA in fact succeeded
in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. See also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto
ERA, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1323 (2006); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1457, 1476-77 (2001) ("Today, it is
difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is different from what it
would have been if the ERA had been adopted." (footnote omitted)).
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admissions to elite schools or government contracts. When such programs
are challenged on equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court has
maintained (by a narrow majority) that all racial classifications must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny.87 This standard applies whether the
classifications are "benign" or "invidious," and so the Court evaluates
preferences for racial minorities in the same manner as policies that seek to
exclude members of racial minorities. The Supreme Court primarily has
adopted an antidiscrimination view of equality that focuses on the harm to
the individual from being classified on the basis of race. Although the
decisions sometimes invoke antisubordination concerns (and these are
frequently expressed in dissenting opinions), antisubordination has not been
the primary principle in race cases. 88
Decisions about affirmative action have been decided by narrow 5-4
majorities.89 While the majority has adhered to strict scrutiny and principles
of formal equality, a minority of justices have held the view preferences for
racial minorities must be treated differently from programs that exclude such
minorities on the basis of race. When evaluating racial preferences, these
justices have emphasized group-based principles of equality in which the
harm to racial minorities is a distinctly group or class-based harm of
persistent discrimination.9" Equality is thus violated when certain racial
groups remain a social underclass whether or not they are treated with formal
equality. This expresses antisubordination themes by acknowledging the
reality of racial stratification and "the injustice that arises when group
identification is turned into a system of subjugation."91 In theory, Fiss and
others articulated the antisubordination principle in part to respond to and
justify the growth of affirmative action measures that could not be reconciled
with principles of formal equality.92 In practice, judges often justify the
constitutionality of racial preferences by correlating group disadvantage and
social inequality with racial groups. 93
87 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 741-42 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243-47 (1995).
88 See Siegel, supra note 7, at 1473.
89 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
90 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Fiss, Another Equality, supra note 10, at 20.
92 Id.
93 Even those Justices who associate group-based harms with the Equal Protection
Clause do not fully adopt all of the consequences of antisubordination theory. There are
structural and institutional limitations, as well as practical considerations, that prevent
this from occurring. See Sabbagh, supra note 22, at 9 (examining various institutional
reasons why courts have not adopted the group-disadvantaging principle, including that it
2009] 1071
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Justice Ginsburg's decisions evaluating equal protection challenges to
affirmative action programs reflect these themes of antisubordination-she
focuses on group harms and structural racial hierarchies that must be
eradicated. This is not the equality for individuals or equal opportunity
stressed in the context of gender discrimination. For example, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,94 the Court considered a challenge to a federal
program designed to give preferences to members of disadvantaged groups in
government contracting. The program at issue gave a prime contractor
"additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small
businesses controlled by 'socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals.' 95 Pursuant to the contract, the contractor must presume that
such individuals include "Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities."96 In a 5-4
decision, the Court reiterated that the program, like all racial classifications
must be evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard.97 The Court, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, explained that "holding 'benign' state and
federal racial classifications to [a] different standard[] does not square with"
the essential principle that the equality guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "protect persons, not groups."98
Justice Ginsburg disagreed and her dissent in Adarand emphasized the
existing disadvantages of African-Americans and the long history of legal
and social measures designed to maintain "White Supremacy." 99 She
reflected on the persistence of racial inequality: "Bias both conscious and
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps
up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination
are ever genuinely to become this country's law and practice."' 00 Justice
Ginsburg here argued that certain structural, racial hierarchies must be
dismantled before minorities can enjoy true equality of opportunity.
Articulating these principles in greater detail, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, wrote in dissent that the Court need not be "consistent" in
its treatment of racial classifications: "There is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system
and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination
cannot be universalized nor expressed as an abstract principle); Siegel, supra note 7, at
1473 n.10.
94 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
95 Id. at 205.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 227.
98Id.
99 Id. at 272-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100Adarand, 515 U.S. at 274 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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is an engine of oppression .... Remedial race-based preferences reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society."'' Here caste and
subordination provide explicit justifications for allowing racial preferences
that aim to remedy social inequality. Justice Stevens emphasized that
intentions matter and that the government's decision to "impose incidental
costs on the majority of their constituents in order to provide a benefit to a
disadvantaged minority" may be "entirely consistent with the ideal of
equality." 10 2 This conception of equality reflects the idea that individuals
may be treated unequally in order to achieve a more equal allocation of
goods between racial groups. So long as the government truly aims for
equality of opportunity between racial groups, it may classify individuals on
the basis of race to achieve that goal. Accordingly to Justice Stevens, "well-
intentioned" racial policies get less judicial scrutiny than other more
invidious racial classifications. This focus on equality across groups or class
membership has an illiberal aspect, as it is willing to overlook individual and
particular harms in favor of a broad-brush concern for racial groups. This
suggests that the experience of race can trump that of the individuals, or at
least that the federal government may design "beneficial" policies based on
race, rather than individual need or circumstances. 10 3
In Gratz v. Bollinger,10 4 the Court invalidated the University of
Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action program. 10 5 That program
automatically awarded underrepresented minority applicants (African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans) an additional 20 points out of
a total of 150 points in the admissions process.'0 6 This award of points had
the effect of making race "decisive for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority applicant."'1 7 As the Court explained, "The
selection index thus precludes admissions counselors from conducting the
type of individualized consideration the Court's opinion in Grutter requires:
101 Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 247-48.
103 Id. at 253 (arguing that Congress is entitled to greater deference when it enacts a
program designed to foster equality than the deference due a state legislature); id. at 271
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "large deference is owed by the Judiciary to
Congress' institutional competence and constitutional authority to overcome historic
racial subjugation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
105 Id. at 245.
106 Id. at 255. The admissions index was divided into ranges: "100-150 (admit); 95-
99 (admit or postpone); 90-94 (postpone or admit); 75-89 (delay or postpone); 74 (delay
or reject)." Id.
107 Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 277 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[T]his mechanized selection index score, by and large, automatically
determines the admissions decision for each applicant.").
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consideration of each applicant's individualized qualifications, including the
contribution each individual's race or ethnic identity will make to the
diversity of the student body ... 108 The Court emphasized "the importance
of considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the
qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's
ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education." 109
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the program passed
constitutional muster. In reaching this conclusion she did not argue that the
program does in fact make individualized determinations for admissions of
underrepresented minority students. Rather, Justice Ginsburg implicitly
rejected such individualized determinations as the standard. Instead she
explained that a different constitutional standard should apply to affirmative
action programs than to programs of exclusionary discrimination.' 10 In
ensuring equal protection, policymakers can "distinguish between policies of
exclusion and inclusion."' I  Justice Ginsburg noted, "Actions designed to
burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and
its after effects have been extirpated." 1 2 Justice Ginsburg argued that similar
treatment of inclusionary and exclusionary programs makes no sense so long
as the vestiges of discrimination remain.'1 13 She observed, "In the wake 'of a
system of racial caste only recently ended,' large disparities endure."' 14 To
support this point she identified racial disparities in employment, education,
and access to health care, as well as economic racial discrimination in real
estate markets and consumer transactions. 115
The dissent failed to discuss racial stereotypes or individual harm. The
analysis instead stretched across society-seeking to identify disadvantage
and stratification along the group characteristic of race. As Justice Ginsburg
explained, African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans "historically
have been relegated to inferior status by law and social practice; their
members continue to experience class-based discrimination to this day."', 16
Similarly, she noted that "[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression is
still visible in our society, and the determination to hasten its removal
108 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 271 (majority opinion).
110 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Il Id.
112 Id.
1 3 Id. at 298.
1 14 Id. at 299 (citation omitted).
115 Id. at 299-300 & nn. 1-9.
116 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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remains vital."'1 17 Her dissent did not consider the individual members of
underrepresented racial groups, but treated them as a group and focused on
their "status" and the "racial oppression" that endures in our society. 118 This
group-based focus allowed Justice Ginsburg to conclude that the University
of Michigan's undergraduate program was constitutional, even though it did
not make an individualized assessment of each applicant, but rather crudely
assigned all individuals of certain identified racial groups a substantial and
undifferentiated advantage in the admissions process. Comparing her opinion
in Gratz to her opinions in Miller or the VMI case, there is a striking
difference in focus-members of racial minority groups may be treated along
racial lines for the benefit of their racial group (and perhaps society more
generally), but preferences for women must be viewed skeptically lest they
reinforce gender stereotypes and overlook individual qualities.
In the context of racial preferences, several justices have repeatedly
argued that affirmative action should be treated differently from other forms
of more "invidious" discrimination and that there is a different social
meaning between a "No Trespassing" sign and a "welcome mat."1 19 Justice
Stevens has argued that because of our history we have an intuitive
understanding of what is meant by "affirmative action" and how it differs
from rank discrimination against racial minority groups. 120 This sentiment
serves as justification for the presumably well-intentioned desire to assist
racial minorities as members of racial groups. Nonetheless, the fact that
affirmative action may have different intentions and purposes from previous
forms of discrimination does not support different legal treatment. The idea
that benign and malignant racial classifications should receive different
levels of constitutional scrutiny depends on the tenuous assumption that
judges are able to distinguish between benign and pernicious classifications.
Even with good intentions, preferences for racial minorities may be
pernicious and cause harm to those individuals they are designed to help.
Judges who would apply a lower level of scrutiny to affirmative action
programs assume that they can evaluate which government actions
subordinate and which do not-that they know subordination when they see
it. 121 They argue that affirmative action alleviates the subordination of blacks
117 Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
118 Id.
119 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120See Fiss, Another Equality, supra note 10, at 4 (explaining that this is why we
call it affirmative action or positive discrimination-something different).
121 Cf Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 15 (criticizing Justice Potter Stewart for his
expressed confidence in knowing the difference between unreasonable gender
discrimination and favors for women).
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and other racial minorities, but others disagree and see affirmative action as
reinforcing negative stereotypes about racial minorities. 122
One of the difficulties with the group-centered or antisubordination
viewpoint is that it turns on many contingent and evolving factors. To
determine whether a program helps to dismantle racial hierarchies, a judge
must have a view about the existing hierarchy and what policies will
undermine racial stratification rather than reinforce it. Yet, one can
reasonably ask, what legal grounds can be used for determining whether a
policy perpetuates racial hierarchy? Fiss does not give a specific answer to
this question. 123 There is some vague sense of social, economic, and political
progress, but it is not clear what guideposts the Court should use in
measuring such progress, or how progress should change the Court's
evaluation of racial caste. 124  One is left with the feeling that
antisubordination simply requires us to fall back on prior political or moral
122 For example, empirical evidence "reasonably supports the view that using
preferences tends to exacerbate subtle forms of intergroup bias in the evaluation of
affirmative action beneficiaries." Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1663 (1998)
(analyzing the empirical evidence of how affirmative action generates or perpetuates
negative stereotypes about racial minorities). Beneficiaries of affirmative action have also
attested to the self-doubt that such programs generate. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE
CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 117 (1990) ("The effects of preferential treatment-the
lowering of normal standards to increase black representation-puts blacks at war with
an expanded realm of debilitating doubt, so that doubt itself becomes an unrecognized
preoccupation that undermines their ability to perform."); see also supra note 76
(discussing Justice Thomas's decisions regarding the stigma of racial preferences). See
generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
123 See Alexander, supra note, at 4 ("With respect to gauging a group's social status
(subordinate or not), Fiss again said very little. One gets the impression that such social
status is a function of socio-economic power (average? median? total?), political
influence, and the duration of these conditions. Again, this is about as far from an
algorithm as one is going to find in the annals of proposed legal principles."). But see
Fiss, Another Equality, supra note 10, at 17-18 (acknowledging the difficulties of
implementing the antisubordination principle but maintaining that it is "fully within the
competence of the judiciary").
124 Fiss's criteria for group disadvantage remain vague. See, e.g., Fiss, Another
Equality, supra note 10, at 22; see also Peter H. Schuck, Groups in a Diverse, Dynamic,
Competitive, and Liberal Society: Comments on Owen Fiss's "Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, " ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 7 (2004),
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artl5 ("[T]he criteria necessary to apply Fiss's principle
are not only breathtakingly vague; they also beg precisely the kinds of questions-about
group identity and achievement, political efficacy, inter-group competition, the
distinction between unfair practices and group-disadvantaging practices, and distributive
justice-that judges have no business answering.").
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views of racial equality. There is no other legal or constitutional basis for
evaluating which racial classifications burden minorities and which do not.
Implicit in this view is that perceptions of subordination are not fixed,
but can change over time, as racial groups throw off disadvantage. Capturing
such perceptions may be especially difficult for judges who must decide
cases about racial classifications based on the perspectives expressed by
individual litigants before the Court. In recent cases, primarily white litigants
challenged affirmative action programs and asserted harm based on the fact
that such programs discriminated against them by denying equal treatment.
Such antidiscrimination claims have prevailed in numerous cases, but
dissenting justices have noted the importance of preference programs in
improving racial equality. Imagine if African-Americans regularly started
litigating against affirmative action programs, arguing as Justice Ginsburg
did as an advocate for gender equality, that such programs perpetuate
negative stereotypes about African-Americans, fail to assess them on
individual merit, and violate equal protection. The group-disadvantaging
view of racial preferences seems to foreclose this possibility, or the
legitimacy of such a perspective. 125 If affirmative action programs pass
constitutional scrutiny because of persistent racial inequality, the claims of
minority individuals do not fit into the analysis-individual voices, needs,
and merits may be overlooked. Widespread racial inequality exists whether
or not racial minorities believe that they benefit from racial preferences. On
the other hand, if the understanding of race-based affirmative action
gradually shifted in light of such litigation (much as the understanding of
gender equality shifted through the advocacy of Justice Ginsburg and others),
does the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause turn on the views of various
groups? Does the constitutionality of a program depend on whether the
beneficiaries like the program?
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg recognizes the danger of racial preferences
when she explains that such programs must be limited in duration.
Affirmative action must end at some point when racial minority groups
achieve a greater measure of equality. 126 Implicit in this is the notion that
such programs are less than desirable, and perhaps even unconstitutional,
once greater equality has been achieved. Of course, this only raises the more
difficult question of how can we know when sufficient progress has been
made towards "genuinely equal opportunity [that] will make it safe to sunset
125 See Sabbagh, supra note 22, at 9 (arguing that the group-disadvantaging
principle is difficult to reconcile with the requirement that the law "transcend the
contingent and heterogeneous character of social experience").
126 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing international
agreements supporting the idea that affirmative action programs are temporary measures
only until equality objectives are achieved).
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affirmative action." 127 Given widespread socio-economic disparities in our
society that in part track racial groups, what would greater equality look like?
For instance, women arguably still face discrimination and lower wages and
yet these problems do not insulate most gender preferences for women in
Justice Ginsburg's view.
What appears to be missing from Justice Ginsburg's discussion of these
"benign" racial preferences is the skepticism she brings to bear on gender
classifications, the scrutiny that even well-intentioned preferences may
impermissibly reinforce stereotypes by treating individuals on the basis of
gender stereotypes, rather than on individual need or merit. There is a
significant degree of acceptance for race consciousness and categorizing by
racial groups, and very little toleration for gender consciousness. What
accounts for the difference?
Justice Ginsburg has offered some reasons for the different treatment of
affirmative action in the context of race and gender. She has explained that
there are important differences between historical and social causes of race
and gender discrimination: "For women have not been impeded to the extent
ghettoized minorities have been by the lingering effects of involuntary
segregation in housing and community life. Females are found as frequently
as males in every neighborhood. No buses are required to place boys and
girls together in the same classroom." 128
More recently, dissenting from the Court's opinion in Gratz, Justice
Ginsburg focused on the ongoing discrimination faced by racial minorities
citing large disparities in unemployment, poverty, and access to health care,
as well as unequal wages and job opportunities. 129 In her view, these facts
support affirmative action for a time to promote greater socio-economic
equality. Such disparities, however, also exist for women. For instance,
Justice Ginsburg mentions the long history of gender discrimination in
immigration policy against women in the Miller decision. 130 She just reaches
different conclusions from the history of persistent discrimination. In Grutter
the history of discrimination allows her to find the racial preference
constitutional, whereas in Miller the history of gender discrimination
supports a finding that a gender preference is unconstitutional.
127 Id. at 346 ("From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast,
that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action." (footnote omitted)).
128 Ginsburg, supra note 63, at 472-73.
129 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 299-301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing a variety of census
and other data regarding persistent inequality between whites and non-whites).
13 0 See supra notes 55-61 & accompanying text.
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Justice Ginsburg notes "a laudable governmental purpose ... should not
immunize a race-conscious measure from careful judicial inspection.' 131
Nonetheless, the actual inspection made by the dissenting justices in Gratz
and other recent affirmative action cases does not focus on whether such
programs result from overbroad generalizations or stereotypes, or whether
they disserve individuals. Rather, the emphasis is on how racial minorities
"continue to experience class-based discrimination to this day .... ,,132
Common experience confirms the truth of this statement, but it rests on
generalizations about how individuals of racial minority groups are treated
and affected by historic patterns of discrimination. These are, however,
simply generalizations in a country that has elected its first African-
American president, who in turn has appointed the first Latina woman to the
Supreme Court. Discrimination may not be eradicated, but it affects
individuals differently based on their varied life circumstances and personal
characteristics. 133
Many affirmative action programs, such as the point system in Gratz,134
do not treat racial minorities as individuals, but rather use stereotypes about
the preparation and competitiveness of racial minorities. If a minority group
is underrepresented, then all members of that group receive an
undifferentiated and often decisive boost in the admissions process. By
providing preferences, such programs reflect the idea that racial minorities
cannot achieve equality in fact through equality of opportunity. Blanket
racial preferences assume that racial minorities need different or special
opportunities in order to get to equal outcomes. This assumption brands all
racial minorities as needing a helping hand, when no doubt many individuals
who are African-American or Hispanic or Native American could compete
on their own merits. Yet when admitted into a program that practices
affirmative action, these individuals will have the stereotype applied to them,
just as will their less prepared or less fortunate colleagues. Justice Thomas
understands the dignitary harm that can result from application of a racial
label, from categorizing individuals by race. 135 This is the same type of harm
that Justice Ginsburg perceives in dividing people up by gender-
irrespective of motive, the classification is the harm because it reinforces
divisions and stereotypes along characteristics that should be irrelevant to
government action.
131 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132Id at 303.
133 The majority in Gratz is willing to permit elite institutions of higher learning to
use individualized considerations of race in the admissions process. See id. at 268
(majority opinion).
134 See supra note 106 & accompanying text.
135 See supra note 76.
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Choosing to put out a separate entrance for minorities, not just a
welcome mat, overlooks or minimizes the dignitary harms to individuals,
even if that entrance is in front and not at the back of the building. In cases
dealing with gender classifications, Justice Ginsburg regularly rejected
preferences that rested on the assumptions and stereotypes of women as
homemakers-even when those programs sought to help women by
minimizing the effects of the reality that many women were homemakers
financially dependent upon their husbands.136 Even where the laws sought to
provide a benefit that would assist women, Justice Ginsburg argued that legal
reinforcement of gender roles made such classifications pernicious and
unconstitutional. 137 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg would reject preferences
for citizen mothers over citizen fathers, or tax exemptions for widows, but
not widowers. This reasoning of individual and formal equality should be
extended to racial minorities. Affirmative action responds to the difficulties
faced by some racial minorities in gaining access to scarce goods, but the
classification of racial minorities in this way simply reinforces and
entrenches the assumptions and prejudices that have led to widespread
inequality between racial groups.
IV. INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY FOR EVERYONE
Justice Ginsburg has recognized that at the heart of equal protection
is the idea of essential human dignity, that we are all people entitled to
respect from our Government as persons of full human stature, and must not
be treated as lesser creatures. The idea of respect for the dignity of each
human is, I think, essentially what the Equal Protection Clause is about.138
Justice Ginsburg has also written "the equal dignity of individuals is part
of the constitutional legacy, shaped and bequeathed to us by the framers, in a
most vital sense."'139 It would be hard to disagree with a concept of essential
human dignity. Dignity, like equality, however, is a value that can have many
different meanings. 140 To give just a few examples, dignity may mean
respect for individual autonomy, for the capacity of each person to choose
13 6 See supra note 70 & accompanying text (discussing Ginsburg's brief in Kahn v.
Shevin).
137 See supra notes 55-61 & accompanying text (discussing Miller v. Albright).
138 Remarks of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, March 11 2004, CUNY School of Law, 7 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 221, 238-39 (2004) [hereinafter Ginsburg Remarks].
139 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN'S
RIGHTS xi-xii (Clare Cushman ed., 2001).
14 0 See Rao, supra note 23.
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how to live. Alternatively, dignity may require social recognition of one's
lifestyle or group.
In her writings and jurisprudence on gender equality, Justice Ginsburg
has favored the dignity and equality belonging to each individual. She speaks
of essential human dignity as being treated as a person of "full human
stature" and as "respect for the dignity of each human."' 141 Similarly, as
discussed above, she rejects "myths or stereotypes inhibiting women's
achievement of their full human potential."'1 42 Realizing one's potential is a
distinctively individual achievement-dignity here means removing barriers
to the achievement of such potential. In the context of gender discrimination,
Justice Ginsburg repeatedly emphasizes the themes of individual merit and
achievement, of allowing all men and women to pursue their interests free of
legal classifications based on stereotypes about the roles of men and women.
As she explained in the VMI case, equal protection requires treating women
as individuals, of accommodating and granting opportunity to those who
belie generalizations: "generalizations about 'the way women are,' estimates
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity
to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average
description."' 143 To the extent that she would recognize affirmative action for
women, it is only on very narrow terms, and with great skepticism about the
benefits of classifying on the basis of gender, even if for the intended benefit
of women.
Justice Ginsburg, however, expresses a different conception of dignity in
the context of racial discrimination. 144 When considering affirmative action
programs, Justice Ginsburg focuses primarily on racial groups, the social
harms and the effects of historic discrimination suffered by these groups,
rather than denial of equal opportunity to individuals. She has repeatedly
given less individual scrutiny to benign racial classifications because she
focuses on group differences across society.
Alongside this advocacy, however, many feminists argued that
biological differences between men and women make formal equality
inappropriate and incongruous to sex equality, 145 but this position has not
141 Ginsburg Remarks, supra note 138, at 238-39.
142 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 63, at 269.
143 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
144 See supra Part III.
145See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Becker, supra note 79 (discussing
pregnancy and difference); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way
Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 1118, 1136-50
(1986) (discussing pregnancy and maternity leave policies). More traditional legal
scholars similarly rely upon biological differences between men and women to justify a
lower standard of review for policies that distinguish along gender lines.
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received significant recognition in judicial decisions. Formal equality for
women, not differential treatment, remains the thrust of the Supreme Court's
decisions.
What explains the greater trust and minimal skepticism for racial
preferences? Perhaps there is an unacknowledged reason why the harms of
affirmative action for racial minorities are often overlooked. There is no
history of "benign" but exclusionary policies for racial minorities. 146 In the
not-so-distant past women faced a number of exclusionary policies justified
(whether sincerely or not) by seeking to protect women from political and
professional life and its burdens. 147 But historically there were few or no
"benign" preferences for racial minorities. "[R]omantic paternalism"'148 was
not used to justify the segregation of blacks from whites or the exclusion of
blacks from voting and jury service; rather, it was pure discrimination borne
of ignorance, hatred, or whatever the ugly emotional, social, and historical
causes of discrimination may be. Discriminatory policies for blacks did not
hide behind tender justifications as they did for women.
Because this category of exclusionary "benign" preferences is largely a
null set for racial minorities, it might be more difficult to see the harm of
modem day well-intentioned preferences such as affirmative action. Racial
minorities historically faced open and egregious discrimination and were
rarely afforded any type of preference, benign or otherwise. Therefore,
affirmative action policies, aimed at promoting substantive equality may
seem like progress, an important break from the discriminatory past. Those
who argue in favor of a lower standard for benign racial preferences may
overlook, deliberately or not, the paternalism of such programs, just as in the
past, politicians and judges were unable (or unwilling) to see the paternalism
and inequality inherent in the "benign" preferences for women.
Yet this historical difference should not make a legal difference and does
not justify less skepticism for racial preferences. Affirmative action and other
similar programs, like the benign preferences for women, insinuate and
146 See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (forthcoming Univ. of Chi.
Press).
147 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 63, at 269 ("Recall that traditional forms of sex
discrimination, unlike obviously odious race-based classifications, were once regarded or
rationalized as benignly favoring or protecting the second sex-laws that prohibited
women from working at night, tending bar, carrying heavy weights, working overtime,
for example."). Feminist advocates such as Ginsburg were concerned that affirmative
action programs for women could not be distinguished from the exclusionary and
paternalistic policies of the past. Mainstream feminist legal strategy remained suspicious
of gender classifications in most circumstances.
148 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (discussing the history of
"benign" preferences for women and the accompanying legal, social, and economic
disadvantage that accompanied such preferences).
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perpetuate stereotypes about how racial minorities are different from whites.
They assume, contrary to ample evidence, that all minorities need special
consideration simply by virtue of being minorities. Affirmative action, by
giving a special benefit to minorities, confirms and reinforces traditional and
historical associations between race and disadvantage, just as preferences for
women reinforced traditional and historic associations between gender and
homemaking, and therefore exclusion or limitation from work and other
opportunities outside the home. By purporting to ameliorate the effects of
traditional divisions between men and women, policies for "women only"
worked to entrench traditional male-female roles. Similarly, racial
preferences that purport to ameliorate discrimination against minorities may
simply reinforce and entrench the causes and attitudes of discrimination. If
one subscribes to a group disadvantaging theory of equality, it should at least
be an open question whether affirmative action burdens or benefits minorities
as a group, particularly as greater racial equality is achieved.
Justice Ginsburg acutely perceives in the context of gender
classifications that there is harm to the equality of women when they are
treated differently from men, even when such difference is purportedly for
the benefit of women. Different treatment undermines equality and harms the
dignity of individual women. Moreover, it reaffirms patterns of
subordination. Applying Justice Ginsburg's principles on gender equality,
one might conclude that affirmative action for racial minorities harms
individual dignity by assuming that persons of a minority race cannot
compete with others on an equal footing simply by virtue of their race. It is a
discriminatory and troubling assumption that has no functional connection to
a person's background, experiences, or need. There is a dignitary harm that
occurs when one is not counted as an individual, but rather treated simply as
a member of a group. Such treatment undermines the concept of equal
citizenship in the context of race, no less than in the context of gender.
It is hard to see how racial preferences satisfy Justice Ginsburg's criteria
under the Equal Protection Clause of treating racial minorities with respect,
as persons of full human stature. These programs diminish the individual
accomplishments of members of racial minority groups by lumping all such
individuals together and placing them into a racial category. The programs
do not use functional criteria-for example, to consider whether a person has
suffered from economic disadvantage-and then allocate preferences along
those lines. Rather, affirmative action programs usually sweep with a broad
brush. They confer benefits along the lines of race and use race as a proxy for
disadvantage and inability to compete on an equal footing. This then
perversely reinforces the historic associations between race and
disadvantage. In Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence, being a person of "full
human stature" requires individual treatment for women, but group treatment
for minorities. It assumes one theory of equality for women and another for
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racial minorities, without providing a clear justification for the difference.
Both women and minorities have suffered, and still sometimes suffer,
political, legal, social and economic discrimination. Nonetheless, today racial
minorities as well as women constitute heterogeneous groups, diverse along
social, economic, and political markers. So why does equality require
treating women as individuals, but allow treating racial minorities as
members of groups?
A satisfactory answer to this puzzle remains to be provided. This
divergence in treatment for women and racial minorities, two groups who
have suffered historic disadvantage in social, economic, and political life,
suggests some of the difficulties with antisubordination principles. Because
this equality principle depends on social norms of belonging and recognition,
it remains highly contingent and depends on changing social values. In
Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence, for women, equality and belonging mean
largely equal treatment with men; but for racial minorities, equality and
social belonging mean preferential treatment along group lines. The different
treatment between the two groups demonstrates, at least, that this equality
principle depends on highly contextual understanding of which individuals
are a part of "groups" that matter for legal purposes. Evaluations of group
disadvantage within the antisubordination principle are similarly highly
contested. Some justices argue that affirmative action helps to eliminate
racial castes in our society, whereas others argue just the opposite-that
affirmative action reinforces such castes by continuing to divide up
individuals on the basis of race. The antisubordination principle seems to
offer no way to resolve this dispute, which may be one reason a majority of
the Supreme Court has adhered to a primarily individualist principle of
formal equality for both gender and racial classifications. This principle is
not without its difficulties, but in most circumstances there are few disputes
about what such equality requires.
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